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INTRODUCTION

In the course of writing the book, Disabled Education,1 I read
about 100 hearing officer decisions in five different jurisdictions that
were resolved under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).2 California was one of those jurisdictions. In this paper, I
will generally discuss the trends that I found in each of those
jurisdictions and reflect on how the California hearing officer
decisions compared to decisions rendered in the other jurisdictions
(New Jersey, Florida, Ohio, and the District of Columbia).
Although I will report overall win-loss rates before hearing
officers in the following paragraph, one should be cautious about
drawing conclusions from win-loss rates.3 Even if plaintiffs prevail
one hundred percent of the time, it is impossible to know what results
were reached in cases that were settled. Similarly, if plaintiffs
always lose, it is impossible to know if that is because they only
choose to litigate truly weak cases and settle many strong cases with
quite favorable results. Because the IDEA encourages alternative
dispute resolution,4 it is especially difficult to know what to conclude
by looking exclusively at litigated cases. Nonetheless, settlement

* Distinguished University Professor & Heck-Faust Memorial Chair in
Constitutional Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
I would like to thank Patrick Noonan for collecting the California decisions and
thank then-Moritz Librarian Stephanie Ziegler for helping me find innumerable
sources during this research. I would also like to thank Julie Waterstone, Paul
Grossman, Joe Tulman, and the participants at the Pepperdine Law School Special
Education Conference for providing helpful feedback.
1

RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (forthcoming 2013).
2
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012). Under the IDEA, a parent can file a
complaint with the State educational agency if he or she believes the school district
is not complying with the IDEA. Id. § 1415. If the dispute cannot be resolved
voluntarily through a resolution session or mediation then a state-level hearing
officer resolves it. See id. (procedural safeguards).
3
For discussion of some of the factors that should cause one to be
cautious in interpreting win-loss rates, see Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001); Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 99 (1999).
4
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e), (f)(1)(B) (2012).
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occurs under the shadow of the law. If parents perceive that they are
likely to be able to win at a due process hearing, then they might be
more willing to hold out for a highly favorable settlement than if they
understand that parents virtually never win. Because hearing officer
decisions, but not settlements, are public records, one must expect
that hearing officer decisions influence the content of settlements.
This factor is especially salient in California because hearing officers
also serve as mediators (in cases in which they are not the hearing
officer) and might use the technique of “reality check” to help
resolve disputes in ways that reflect decisions they have rendered in
similar matters. Further, California has the most user-friendly
hearing officer database in the country,5 making it especially easy for
litigants to follow its decisions.
The overall win/loss rate in California is typical of the other
jurisdictions I examined in a broad, global sense, but with the caveat
that the parent victories were often partial in California. I
categorized a case as “pro-parent” if the parent prevailed on any
ground; it was typical for parents to prevail on only one out of many
claims in California so these “victories” are often quite partial.
Parents or guardians prevailed, at least in part, in 35 of 101 cases
(34.6%) in California decided between May 3, 2010 and June 20,
2011. Parents prevailed in 32.7% of cases that went to the merits in
Ohio, 15.1% of cases in Florida (but with a very high rate of
voluntary resolution), 5.4% of regular petitions in New Jersey, 17.2%
of emergent relief petitions in New Jersey, and 57% of cases in the
District of Columbia.6 Other than the D.C. decisions, I therefore
found that the hearing officer decisions were disproportionately proschool district. The burden of proof placed on parents often made it
difficult for them to prevail even when it appeared they had some
strong arguments. I argue in Part II that these hearing officers are
often placing a higher burden of proof on parents than contemplated
by the Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast.7

5

See Special Education Decisions & Orders, CAL. DEP’T EDUC.,
http://www.dgs.ca.gov/oah/SpecialEducation/searchDO.aspx (last visited Jan. 9,
2013).
6
For further discussion, see RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION 109–
216 (forthcoming 2013).
7
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
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The Supreme Court in Schaffer expected that certain
conditions of fairness would be present when it allocated the burden
of proof on parents. Specifically, it anticipated that parents would
have full access to records and reports to counter the school district’s
“firepower.”8 It also expected hearing officers to conduct hearings
flexibly so that parents who were not represented by a lawyer or did
not speak English would be able to prevail.9 In Part II, I argue that
some California decisions do not seem consistent with those fairness
considerations. Of the twenty California cases in which a lawyer did
not represent parents, the parents prevailed in only one case.10 Of the
seven cases involving use of a foreign language interpreter, only one
parent prevailed.11 Greater attention to issues of fairness might cause
parents to have a higher success rate.
Parents in California have particular difficulty prevailing
when they seek to argue that the school district’s proposed
educational program is inadequate. This issue is governed by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Rowley12 and will
be discussed in Part III. Part III will also focus on the decision in J.L.
v. Mercer Island School District,13 which sets the standard for courts
to follow in the Ninth Circuit in these kinds of cases. By examining
the factual record and appellate ruling closely in both Rowley and
Mercer Island, I argue that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth
Circuit intended to impose an overly difficult burden of proof on
parents to demonstrate the inadequacy of educational programs.

8

Id. at 61.
“IDEA hearings are deliberately informal and intended to give ALJs the
flexibility that they need to ensure that each side can fairly present its evidence.
IDEA, in fact, requires state authorities to organize hearings in a way that
guarantees parents and children [IDEA’s] procedural protections.” Id.
10
See Parent ex rel. Student v. Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., No.
2010100854 (OAH Cal. Apr. 8, 2011) (June R. Lehrman, ALJ), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010100854.pdf (last visited
Jan. 9, 2013).
11
See Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Parents ex rel. Student, OAH
Case No. 2010060472 (Dec. 27, 2010) (Robert F. Helfand, ALJ), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010060472.pdf (last visited
Jan. 9, 2013).
12
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
13
575 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2009).
9
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The final hurdle faced by parents in California is the difficulty
of persuading the hearing officer to order a remedy when a
procedural violation has occurred.14 In Part IV, I discuss the legal
standard that applies to these cases and describe some California
district court cases that have concluded that a remedy is appropriate
for a procedural violation. In some of these cases, the district court
overruled the hearing officer to order a remedy. Hearing officers
often interpret their authority too narrowly in determining whether to
order a remedy when a procedural error has occurred.
As this article will reflect, California is a jurisdiction that is
ripe for extensive analysis because its decisions are readily available
in a word-searchable database. It also has a fairly high number of
cases decided on an annual basis so that meaningful conclusions can
be drawn from the cases. It would be helpful if other states offered
such transparency in their special education decisions so that we
could have a more accurate picture of the national landscape in the
field of special education law.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
A.

Schaffer v. Weast

The rules regarding burden of proof derive from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Schaffer v. Weast.15 The Court noted that the
term “burden of proof” encompasses two burdens—the burden of
persuasion (i.e., who loses if the evidence is closely balanced) and
the burden of production (i.e., the obligation to come forward with
evidence at different points in the proceeding).16 The Schaffer case
only involved the “burden of persuasion” aspect of the burden of
proof—who wins if the evidence is closely balanced. The Court held
that the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing
challenging an individual education program (IEP) is placed upon the
party seeking relief.17

14

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2012).
546 U.S. 49 (2005).
16
Id. at 56.
17
Id. at 62.
15
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The Court acknowledged that the rule usually placed the
burden of persuasion on the parent but also noted it could be on the
school district when it is the moving party seeking “to change an
existing IEP . . . or if parents refuse to allow their child to be
evaluated.”18 In my sample of 101 California decisions, there were
twenty-six cases where the school district bore the burden of proof.19
Parents only prevailed in three of those cases (11.5 %), an even lower
success rate than when parents had the burden of proof.20 Those
numbers do not necessarily mean that the hearing officer was
incorrectly allocating the burden of proof but they do suggest that
close examination of whether hearing officers are truly imposing the
burden of proof on school districts in those cases is warranted. A
close examination of the Schaffer decision provides a basis for
arguing that California hearing officers are often making it too
difficult for parents to prevail in special education cases, because
they are not applying the fairness considerations emphasized by the
Schaffer Court.
The Schaffer case involved a seventh grade boy, Brian
Schaffer, who had attended a private school from prekindergarten to
seventh grade.21 When the private school concluded that it could no
longer offer Brian an appropriate education, his parents contacted the
local public school district to have Brian classified as disabled and to
receive an education funded by the school district.22 The parents and
the school district agreed that Brian was disabled but could not agree
on the content of his IEP.23 The school district proposed one of two
public school placements; his parents insisted that the only
appropriate placement was another private school.24
Their
disagreement involved the issue of what should be the content of the
first IEP drafted by the school district in consultation with Brian’s

18

Id. at 53.
See COLKER, supra note 6.
20
Id.
21
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54. See generally Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp.
2d 538 (D. Md. 2000) (appeal from Administrative Law Judge decision in Schaffer
v. Weast).
22
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54–55.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 55.
19
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parents.25 When the parties could not come to an agreement, Brian’s
parents initiated a due process hearing challenging the school
district’s proposed IEP and seeking reimbursement for unilaterally
sending Brian to a private school.26
At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) held that
the parents bore the burden of proof and, in a close case, ruled in
favor of the school district.27 On appeal, the district court reversed
and remanded, holding that the burden of proof should have been
placed on the school district.28 On remand, the hearing officer ruled
in favor of the parents, concluding that the burden of proof was
dispositive to the outcome of the case.29 Ultimately, the Fourth
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court ruled that the district
court was wrong to conclude that the burden of proof was on the
school district in this kind of case.30 Because the hearing officer had
found that the allocation of the burden of proof was dispositive to the
outcome in this case, the school district prevailed in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision.31
But the more important question from the Schaffer case is the
following: what did the Court mean by the weight of the burden of
proof that should be placed on the party seeking relief (in this case,
the parents), and how does that holding relate to cases being decided
in California?
In deciding to allocate the burden of proof on the moving
party, the Supreme Court emphasized that the statute’s procedural
safeguards are designed so that parents “are not left to challenge the
government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary
evidence, or without an expert with the firepower to match the
opposition.”32 The Court emphasized that “IDEA hearings are
deliberately informal and intended to give ALJs the flexibility that
25

Id.
Id.
27
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55.
28
Id.
29
Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396, 397 n. 2 (D. Md. 2002), rev’d,
Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004).
30
See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004); Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49 (2005).
31
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
32
Id. at 61.
26
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they need to ensure that each side can fairly present its evidence.
IDEA, in fact, requires state authorities to organize hearings in a way
that guarantees parents and children the procedural protections of the
Act.”33
The ALJ should, therefore, conduct the hearing in a way that
gives the moving party a realistic opportunity to prevail. One
particularly important rule is that parents can use record reviews and
an independent educational evaluation (IEE) to overcome what
otherwise would be characterized as the school district’s “natural
advantage” in these cases. The Schaffer Court emphasized the
importance of these rules:
[P]arents have the right to review all records that the
school possesses in relation to their child. They also
have the right to an “independent educational
evaluation of the[ir] child.” The regulations clarify
this entitlement by providing that a “parent has the
right to an independent educational evaluation at
public expense if the parent disagrees with an
evaluation obtained by the public agency.” IDEA thus
ensures parents access to an expert who can evaluate
all the materials that the school must make available,
and who can give an independent opinion. They are
not left to challenge the government without a realistic
opportunity to access the necessary evidence, or
without an expert with the firepower to match the
opposition.34
The Supreme Court described both record reviews and independent
educational evaluations as “rights” even though the IDEA provides
that school districts can contest a parent’s request for an independent
educational evaluation.35 When parents do not have full access to
educational records and independent educational evaluations, it is

33

Id.
Id. at 60–61 (citations omitted).
35
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(i) (2012) (providing that a school district
may refuse to pay for the parent’s independent educational evaluation if it files a
due process complaint and demonstrates that its evaluation was “appropriate”).
34
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possible that the Court does not consider it appropriate to allocate the
burden of proof on the parent as the moving party.
Parents in California seem to have difficulty obtaining full
access to educational records and independent educational
evaluations. During the time period that I investigated, the school
district opposed the parents’ request for an independent educational
evaluation in nine cases.36 In three of these cases, the parents used a
Spanish-language interpreter, raising some concerns about the
parents’ full access to educational records.37 The school district was
the petitioner in each of those cases and the hearing officer correctly
allocated the burden of proof on the school district.38 Despite the
district having the burden of proof, the parents only prevailed in one
of those cases (11.1%) and, even in that case, the parents did not
prevail entirely.39 The hearing officer ordered an evaluation at public
expense in the areas of assistive technology and psycho-education
but not in the area of speech and language, where the Spanishspeaking parents had the most concern.40
Because settlements are rendered under the shadow of the
law, I suspect that school districts feel emboldened in California to
challenge IEE requests because of this pattern of prevailing before
hearing officers at due process hearings, despite having the burden of
proof. I wonder if the Schaffer Court would have allocated the
burden of proof on parents, had the Court known the low likelihood
of the parents’ success when the school district challenges the
parents’ request for an IEE, as found in California. In sum, the
Schaffer Court emphasized that the IDEA’s procedural protections
were created to “ensure that the school bears no unique informational
advantage.”41 The ALJ has the obligation to ensure that the due
process hearing is held in a sufficiently flexible way to accomplish
justice.42 Examples of flexibility would include generous application
of rules regarding access to school records, requests for independent

36

See COLKER, supra note 6, at 183–206.
See id.
38
See id.
39
See id. See also Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 11.
40
Coachella Valley Unified Sch. Dist., supra note 11, at 30.
41
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61.
42
See id.
37
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educational evaluations, and assurance that English-language issues
are not impairing procedural due process.
B.

Independent Educational Evaluation Example

As discussed above, the Supreme Court presumed that parents
would have complete access to educational records and an
independent educational evaluation when it decided to place the
burden of proof on parents when they challenge an IEP as
inappropriate.43 One California case highlights the difficulty for
many parents in obtaining that kind of “firepower.”44
“Kathleen” Short-Nagel was in first grade when it became
apparent to her parents and the school district she was struggling in
school.45 At the end of the school year, on June 3, 2009, the school
district convened a “Student Study Team” (SST) to discuss her
difficulties and challenges.46 The team recommended modifications
and an action plan, including one-on-one assistance.47 The ALJ
opinion then stated that the action plan was implemented during the
2010-2011 school year.48 However, the plan should have been
implemented during the 2009–2010 school year. The reference to the
2010-2011 school year was a mistake in the ALJ’s opinion.
Because of continued difficulties in school, the SST referred
Kathleen for an initial special education assessment on February 17,

43

See supra text accompanying note 8.
See L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Parent ex rel. Student, OAH Case No.
2010100865 (Feb. 3 2011) (Eileen M. Cohn, ALJ), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010100865.Appellate%20
History.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2013), rev’d sub nom, K.S.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch.
Dist., No. CV 11-3270 CBM (MANx) (Mar. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Short-Nagel
ALJ Opinion]. See also K.S.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 11-3270 CBM
(MANx)
(C.D.
Cal.
Mar.
20,
2012),
available
at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2010100865%20USDC%20Order%20Reversing%20ALJ's%20Decision.pdf (last visited Jan. 9,
2013) [hereinafter Short-Nagel District Court Opinion].
45
Id. at 2. The opinions do not provide the student’s first name. To
humanize the discussion, I have named her “Kathleen.”
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
44
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2010.49 At the time of the assessment, Kathleen was receiving inschool pullout intervention classes for reading and writing; bi-weekly
private tutoring funded by her parents; small group, individual, and
modified instruction and expectations; extended time; preferential
seating; repetition of directions; and breaking assignments into
smaller components.50 As a result of the February 17, 2010 meeting
and Kathleen’s continued difficulties in school, the school district
agreed to conduct an IDEA eligibility assessment and, if appropriate,
hold an IEP meeting.51
The school district assigned its psychologist, Karen Menzie,
to write the eligibility evaluation.52 She conducted evaluations of
Kathleen and wrote her report on March 23, 2010.53 The school
district also asked special education teacher, Barbara Zafran, to
conduct some evaluations.54 Zafran completed her evaluations on
March 19, 23, and 24, 2010,55 with two of those testing dates
occurring after Menzie had written her eligibility evaluation. Menzie
concluded that Kathleen qualified as a student with a specific
learning disability, primarily on the basis of her score on one subtest
of a visual processing test.56
The school district held an IEP meeting on April 29, 2010.57
The topic of the IEP meeting was both the eligibility decision and the
IEP for Kathleen.58 In California, school districts often combine the
eligibility and IEP meetings, providing little time for the team to
write the IEP. The IEP team considered two possible areas of
suspected disability (attention deficit disorder and specific learning
disability) at the April 29, 2010 meeting.59 “The IEP team
determined that [the] [s]tudent was eligible for special education as a
pupil with a specific learning disability due to deficits in oral and
49

Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
51
Id. at 3.
52
Id. at 4.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 3.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 13.
57
Id. at 15.
58
Id.
59
Id.

50
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visual processing.”60 Nothing in the ALJ opinion indicated that the
IEP team approved the IEP at that meeting (or if one was approved at
all).
Kathleen’s mother saw the assessment for the first time just
before the April meeting, and she did not disagree with the adequacy
of the school district’s assessment at that meeting. Nonetheless, she
had increasing concerns that the district did not fully understand the
nature of her daughter’s visual processing disorder and sought further
information from the district. After the district made the odd
suggestion that she see an eye doctor to learn more about her
daughter’s neurological, visual processing deficit, she consulted with
a lawyer about her next appropriate step. Her lawyer suggested she
request an IEP meeting and seek a school-funded independent
educational evaluation. On September 27, 2010, Kathleen’s mother
requested an IEP meeting to register her disagreement with the
assessment report and, immediately thereafter, provided a written
request for an IEE at the district’s expense.61
Rather than comply with this request, the district filed a Due
Process Hearing Request on October 19, 2010 in which it argued that
Menzie’s assessment was appropriate and, therefore, the district did
not need to pay for Kathleen’s IEE.62 After a failed, expedited
mediation attempt, a due process hearing was held. The ALJ
decision in the case was not rendered until February 3, 201163
because a continuance was granted on November 4, 2010 at the
request of the parents.64 Although Congress specifies that these cases
be decided quickly,65 in practice, that rule is frequently not followed.
Kathleen’s parents could not participate in the due process hearing
until they had retained an expert who could review the school
district’s evaluation closely.66 The ALJ ruled in favor of the school
district67 and Kathleen’s parents appealed the ALJ decision to a

60

Id.
See id. at 15.
62
See id.
63
See id. at 26.
64
Id. at 1.
65
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012).
66
See Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 16.
67
Id. at 25.
61
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federal district court.68 The federal district court judge ruled in their
favor on March 20, 2012, more than a year later.69 The district court
judge found that the IEE should commence within thirty days of the
order so that the results of the assessment could be used to formulate
an IEP for the 2012–2013 school year, when Kathleen would be in
fifth grade.70
The school district had the burden of proof at the due process
hearing to demonstrate that its assessment was adequate.71 As the
Supreme Court explained in Schaffer, the expectation is that the
district will pay for the parents’ educational evaluation of their child
when the parents seek to contest the eligibility classification or the
adequacy of the IEP, because the parent, who would have the burden
of proof in such challenges, needs to have the same “firepower” as
the school district.72
In this case, like many cases in which the district is not able to
demonstrate that its evaluation was adequate, the parent retained an
expert as well as a lawyer (the child’s mother is also licensed to
practice law in California, although she does not practice in the field
of special education). In fact, in every case that I read in which the
ALJ or the federal judge found the district’s evaluation to be
inadequate, the parents hired both an expert and a lawyer.73 That
practice is unfortunate because it turns the IEE process on its head—
parents can only succeed in forcing an objecting district to pay for an
IEE if the parents pay for the expenses of an expert.
In order to maintain any semblance of fairness, a parent
should not be expected to hire an expert to conduct a full psychoeducational evaluation. The parents’ expert should merely assist the
parents in arguing that the district’s evaluation is not adequate in a
context in which the district, not the parent, has the burden of proof.
The ALJ, in this case, claimed to place the burden of proof on the
district but, in reality, seemed to place a heavy burden of proof on the
parents. For example, the ALJ considered whether the parents’

68

Id. at 4.
Id. at 12.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 20.
72
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005).
73
See COLKER, supra note 6, at 183–206.
69
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expert had met Kathleen in evaluating the credibility of the parents’
expert.74 But whether the parents’ expert had met Kathleen is not
relevant to the issue of whether the district had conducted an
appropriate evaluation. Rather than place the burden of proof on the
district to show its evaluation was appropriate, the ALJ compared the
parents’ evaluation with the district’s evaluation and decided which
was more thorough:
[The school psychologist’s] report was not perfect.
However, [her] testimony was honest and she capably
explained the foundation for her opinion. When
weighed against Student’s criticisms, [the school
psychologist’s] report and testimony were given more
weight [than Student’s expert] due to her direct
observation of Student, her reliance upon extensive
school records, and her demonstrated ability to apply
her experience and make a reasoned judgment as to
the source of Student’s deficits.75
Because the school district had the burden of proof, it should have
had to demonstrate that its report met the statutory requirements.
The parents should not even have to use an expert to prevail.
The ALJ lost sight of the bigger picture—if the parents
prevailed, then the district would have had to pay the parents’ expert
to conduct a full and appropriate IEE. The parents should not have to
pay to conduct a full evaluation in order for the ALJ to conclude that
the district did not conduct an appropriate evaluation. The ALJ’s
opinion was overturned, in part, by the district court, but the district
court did not acknowledge the extent to which the ALJ had
misallocated the burden of proof or that the school district’s
evaluation was inappropriate.76
The school district’s evaluation had a tremendous number of
problems that, cumulatively, made it impossible to know the correct
eligibility classification, or what kind of program should be put in
place to assist Kathleen. I will discuss these problems with reference
to the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements.
74

Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 16.
Id. at 13–14.
76
See id.

75
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Problem One

The school district must provide a copy of the evaluation
report and the documentation of determination of eligibility at no cost
to the parent.77 Kathleen’s parents did not receive the report until
just before the April 29, 2010 IEP meeting.78 Further, when her
lawyer subpoenaed the entire assessment file, the district’s records
were found to be missing much of the raw data that formed the
foundation for the school psychologist’s report, making it impossible
for the district to demonstrate that it had administered and scored the
tests correctly.79 Because Zafran, the special education teacher, had
found one error in reporting one of the scores,80 there was some
evidence of sloppiness on the district’s part in record keeping.
Further, the subpoenaed report was different than the one that the
parents received prior to the April 29, 2010 meeting because of an
error in Kathleen’s classroom grades.81 The school’s inability to
produce complete and accurate test results should have been a factor
in concluding whether their testing was adequate.
2.

Problem Two

Assessments are supposed to be used for the purposes for
which the assessments or measures are valid and reliable.82 The
school psychologist administered the TVPS-3 for the purpose of
determining whether Kathleen had a visual processing deficit.83 Her
low score on one subpart of this test was the primary basis upon
which the school psychologist concluded that Kathleen’s problems in
school were due to a deficit in “visual closure.”84 The parents’ expert
testified that the TVPS-3 is not considered to be a reliable assessment

77

34 C.F.R. § 300.306(a)(2) (2012).
Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 14.
79
Id. at 15.
80
Id. at 14.
81
Id.
82
34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(iii) (2012).
83
Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 7.
84
Id. at 16.

78
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tool by the Buros Mental Measurement Yearbook, a reference book
used by clinical psychologists to confirm the validity and reliability
of assessment instruments.85 In fact, the review cited by the parents’
expert stated that “the use of this instrument beyond research
purposes cannot be recommended, because of the absence of useful
reliability and validity information . . . .”86 Specifically, the review
stated that “[i]nterpretation of individual subtest scores or index
scores also cannot be recommended, as these scores have not been
demonstrated to be psychometrically differentiable.”87 Thus, the test
is overall not considered valid or reliable and, more specifically, it is
not valid or reliable to use one subscore to draw this type of
conclusion. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded: “based upon her close
observation of Student during the administration of TVPS-3, Ms.
Menzie obtained reliable test results.”88
Menzie’s “close
observation” should not substitute for the requirement to use valid
and reliable measures especially because the IDEA regulations also
state that an examiner should “[n]ot use any single measure or
assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a child is a
child with a disability . . . .”89 “Close observation” without any
acceptable diagnostic tool cannot be the sole basis for a disability
classification. However, the conclusion that Kathleen had a visual
perceptual deficit was key to Menzie’s entire report.
3.

Problem Three

Assessments are supposed to be administered in accordance
with any instructions provided by the producer of the assessments.90
The school psychologist administered the basic battery of the
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Id. at 18.
Phillip L. Ackerman, Review of the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills, 3rd
Edition in Mental Measurements Yearbook with Tests in Print, available at
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=28e2f981-10b1-4501-959e85b88d0d1e8b%40sessionmgr104&vid=1&hid=126&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3Q
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87
Id. at 4.
88
Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 24.
89
34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(2) (2012).
90
34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(1)(v) (2012).
86

Fall 2012

California Hearing Officer Decisions

477

Cognitive Assessment System (CAS).91 This test was supposed to
measure Kathleen’s utilization of her mental process while she
focused on a particular stimulus and ignored other stimuli.92 Because
it was the only test that the district administered that supposedly
would have provided some data on whether she had attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),93 the test results were quite
important.
Further, the test instructions insisted that test
administrators follow the instructions precisely, because any
alteration could compromise the accuracy of the scores.94
Nonetheless, the school psychologist showed Kathleen how to cross
out wrong answers so that she could correct her answers and also
demonstrated to Kathleen how to complete one type of question.95
This extra assistance drew into question the reliability of the test
results because it could have raised her score.
4.

Problem Four

Similarly, the school psychologist failed to follow instructions
when she administered the BASC-2—a test of social skills. She
administered it to Kathleen’s mother over a telephone while
Kathleen’s mother shopped at a mall, and did not try to administer it
to Kathleen’s father or grandmother who were important
caregivers.96 Thus, the test’s administration was contrary to the
instruction manual’s suggestion to offer it in a “controlled setting.”97
5.

Problem Five

Additionally, a child is supposed to be assessed “in all areas
related to the suspected disability . . . .”98 Here, there was consistent,
but overlooked, evidence that Kathleen might have ADHD. When

91

Short-Nagel ALJ Opinion, supra note 44, at 6.
Id.
93
Id. at 12.
94
Id. at 18.
95
Id. at 12–13.
96
Id. at 18.
97
Id. at 19.
98
34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4) (2012).
92

478

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

Kathleen’s mother paid for a private evaluation of Kathleen in
kindergarten, the examiner concluded Kathleen did not meet the
criteria for ADHD.99 Evidence of Kathleen being “unfocused or
inattentive” was explained as a visual processing deficit rather than
ADHD.100 Similarly, the school psychologist overlooked a low
subscore on the CAS, which was supposed to be reflective of an
executive dysfunction.101 Instead of interpreting that evidence as a
suggestion to administer a proper test for ADHD, the school
psychologist refused to test for ADHD because of the lack of
“clinically significant indications of attention issues from the BASC2 rating scales, or from her observations . . . .”102 But that approach
puts the cart before the horse. On the other hand, since the SST had
considered ADHD to be a possibility,103 Kathleen should have been
validly assessed. The haphazard administration of the BASC-2, a test
not designed to make a proper diagnosis of ADHD, did not meet the
statutory standard for determining whether Kathleen had ADHD.
Moreover, even her observational basis was deficient because, as the
school psychologist admitted, she never visited Kathleen in the
classroom during a language arts lesson that involved reading
(Kathleen’s area of academic weakness) to assess her attention and
behavior.104 In other words, there was no valid observational or
assessment data in support of her decision not to test for ADHD.
6. District Court Reversal of ALJ Decision
Notwithstanding these and other problems with the school
psychologist’s report, the ALJ found the differences in opinion
between the school psychologist and the parents’ expert were based
on “differences in their respective professional judgment as to the
conclusions reached from test data, record, and classroom
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observations.
Despite her apparent competence and candor,
[parents’] expert testimony was not persuasive.”105
This decision was overturned on appeal, although the district
court judge did not find that each of the problems discussed above
demonstrated that the school district’s evaluation was
inappropriate.106 Possibly, the judge did not issue a broader decision
because of the limited scope of review available to a district court
judge. Although a district court judge is supposed to conduct a “de
novo review” of the administrative record, a judge is also supposed to
give “due weight” to the decision of the ALJ.107
The district court judge agreed with Problem One and found
“that the missing files weigh in favor of the district funding an
Independent Educational Evaluation.”108 Further, the judge partially
agreed with Problem Five and found that the “insufficient classroom
observation weighs in favor of the district funding an Independent
Educational Evaluation.”109 In addition, the judge agreed with
Problem Four and found that “the uncontrolled and distracted nature
of the BASC-2 interview with Mother . . . weigh[ed] in favor of the
district funding an Independent Educational Examination.”110
However, the judge also described the “irregularities” as “not as
problematic.”111
The district court judge did not fully agree with Problem Five
and concluded: “while it appears that the District did evaluate
Student in all possible areas, there are areas in which the District
spent an insufficient amount of resources.”112 But, the judge never
explained how the court evaluated Kathleen in the area of ADHD at
all because of the faulty administration of the tests inaccurately tested
for ADHD. Further, the judge did not discuss Problem Two—the use
105
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of inappropriate testing instruments—because Kathleen’s parents’
lawyer did not emphasize that problem on appeal. Therefore,
following this decision, the school district may consider it
appropriate to still administer the TVPS-3 for children with alleged
visual processing deficits.
More troubling was the district court judge’s refusal to
conclude that the ALJ inappropriately allocated the burden of proof
with the language “weighing” the testimony of each of the experts.113
Instead, the district court judge interpreted that language to mean that
the ALJ was merely making a “credibility determination” regarding
the witnesses.114 This was not a case where a plaintiff and a
defendant’s experts witnessed a traffic accident and the court was
trying to figure out who to believe. Instead, here, the ALJ talked
about “weighing” the experts’ testimony in the same sentence that
also criticized the parents’ expert for not meeting Kathleen.115 But,
the parents’ expert did not suggest that she had met Kathleen or had
an independent basis for offering an evaluation based on personallyconducted assessments. The use of the word “weighing” by the ALJ
suggested that she expected to hear that kind of direct testimony from
the parents’ expert rather than confine the case to whether the school
district had met its obligation to test Kathleen appropriately.116
Accordingly, the hearing officer placed nearly an impossible
burden of proof on Kathleen’s parents in order to obtain an
educational evaluation at public expense. Kathleen’s mother, a
lawyer, hired a lawyer to represent her family at the due process
hearing. Also, the family hired an expert who conducted an
extremely thorough review of the school psychologist’s report.117
Since Kathleen’s family was unable to prevail before the ALJ, they
appealed the decision to a federal district court judge and won a year
later.118 Meanwhile, Kathleen, who was in second grade at the
beginning of this process, would be in fifth grade by the time an IEP
based on an appropriate evaluation would take place. An IEE
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requirement cannot provide parents equal “firepower” to sue school
districts if it takes three years to force the school district to pay for
the IEE. Further, by refusing to find that the ALJ misallocated the
burden of proof, the district court did a poor job of preventing this
problem in the future.
A proper evaluation is extremely important in an IEP case.
Kathleen’s health insurance plan would not cover a complete psychoeducational evaluation, and her parents did not have the
approximately five thousand dollars that it would cost to hire a
private consultant to conduct one. Because of the strength of their
case and Kathleen’s mother’s relationship to the legal community,
they could find a lawyer to take their case. But, what about the other
children whose parents are not able to secure a lawyer and expert to
challenge the denial of an IEE? They will not have equal
“firepower” if they seek to challenge an IEP. Without more rulings
by the ALJ in favor of parents, we can expect California school
districts to continue to resist IEE requests.
C.

Other Fairness Considerations

The previous example involved a girl from a middle-class
family; her parents only were able to obtain an IEE at public expense
by appealing an adverse ALJ decision to a federal district court in a
multi-year process. Families from less advantaged circumstances,
such as those in poverty, or those non-English speakers with less
education, face much greater difficulties in obtaining an adequate
education plan.
The following case reflects the difficulties for children who
have parents who are poor, do not speak English as their primary
language, and are disabled. This case involves an eight-year-old boy,
“Pedro.”119 Pedro lived with his mother (who was cognitively
impaired), his infant sister, and grandmother (who was his legal
guardian).120
119

See Parent ex rel. Student v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., OAH Case No.
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His Spanish-speaking grandmother filed a due process
complaint via an interpreter on January 4, 2011 against the Los
Angeles Unified School District on Pedro’s behalf.121 An advocate
for individuals with developmental disabilities accompanied Pedro’s
grandmother to the one-day hearing, but Pedro’s grandmother was
not accompanied by a lawyer.122 The advocate was present to serve
as a witness with regard to Pedro’s mother’s disabilities. Pedro’s
mother did not attend the hearing; his grandmother was the
educational rights holder.123 Like many cases where a lawyer does
not represent the parent or guardian, the record is somewhat sparse.
However, the record does suggest that the school district was not
complying with the IDEA even for issues not raised at the hearing.124
Moreover, it appears that the hearing officer applied the IDEA
narrowly to rule in favor of the district. This case illustrates the need
for fairness so that the parent or guardian of a child has a reasonable
chance of prevailing in light of the school district’s greater resources.
Procedural protections should be fully available to children and their
parents even if they need to use an interpreter.
Pedro was born to a mother who was cognitively impaired
and grew up in a household that included his grandmother (who was
his legal guardian) and his baby sister, who was born when he was
about six years old.125 The family was primarily Spanish speaking,
and Pedro was non-verbal, even at the age of six.126 At the age of
three, the school district classified Pedro as “developmentally
delayed,” and he received special education services, which also
included home to school transportation.127
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When Pedro turned six, at the end of kindergarten, he was no
longer eligible to receive services under the “developmental delay”
category.128 As a result, the school district completed an assessment
and prepared a report on June 1, 2009 that placed him in one of the
school-age categories.129 The report classified Pedro as having a
Specific Learning Disability and a Speech and Language
Impairment.130 The school district should have convened an IEP
meeting within thirty days of the June report to prepare an IEP that
would have been in effect for first grade.131 The record did not
indicate on what date the IEP team met to prepare his new IEP, but
his second annual IEP meeting was held on November 15, 2010.132
Because IEP meetings are held once a year, presumably, the first
meeting was held a year ago on November 15, 2009, four months
later than required under the IDEA and three months after the
beginning of the school year. This delay, which was never
mentioned in the hearing officer’s opinion, suggests that the school
district did not strictly comply with the law.
Pedro’s grandmother filed a due process request on January 4,
2011 because she objected to a change in transportation services
recommended by the school district.133 The school district wanted to
change Pedro’s transportation services so that it would transport
Pedro to Grape Elementary from his local grade school rather than
from his home.134 His grandmother refused to consent to that change
because she considered it too difficult and unsafe for Pedro to walk to
the local grade school without a family member.135 The parties went
to mediation in February 2011 and failed to come to a resolution of
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the case.136 The record indicated that they agreed to a continuance so
the case was heard on April 12, 2011 rather than February 18,
2011.137 The record does not indicate whether the school district
agreed to a “stay put” order to maintain the service pending the
outcome of the hearing. The grandmother did not file a motion for a
“stay put” order. Nonetheless, the school district may have
voluntarily agreed to a “stay put” status quo so that the delay in the
hearing did not negatively impact Pedro.
On page two of the decision, the hearing officer stated that
Pedro was assigned to Grape Elementary School for his special
education services; in the contested IEP, the district asked Pedro to
walk to his local elementary school, 68 Street Elementary School, to
receive transportation to Grape Elementary.138 However, on page
three and throughout the rest of the case, the hearing officer
described the local elementary (where Pedro was asked to walk in
order to catch the bus to Grape Elementary) as being Compton
Elementary.139 The hearing officer opinion does not explain this
discrepancy. This discrepancy is unfortunate because the identity of
the elementary school was a very important element in the case. The
hearing officer concluded that the local elementary school is only six
or seven blocks from Pedro’s home.140 Further, the hearing officer
concluded “there are no hazards on the short walk down residential
streets to Compton Elementary.”141 The accurate identity of the local
elementary school was relevant to those conclusions.
More
importantly, one must wonder how much specific attention the
hearing officer or school district gave to the dangers of the walk itself
because the correct address was not clarified in the record. I looked
at these various elementary schools on a map, and they are within
several blocks of an interstate highway in the Watts neighborhood.
The picture of an easy walk through residential streets may therefore
be highly inaccurate and is relevant to the question of whether Pedro
136
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can safely walk to the local elementary school where he would then
have to wait for a bus. Did the district really consider Pedro’s safety
as he walked to school or simply refuse to budge on this issue
because it was highly confident it could prevail at a due process
hearing at which it knew the grandmother would proceed pro se?
This case also reflects an overly rigid interpretation of the
parents or guardians’ burden of proof. In Schaffer, the Supreme
Court emphasized that “IDEA hearings are deliberately informal and
intended to give ALJs the flexibility that they need to ensure that
each side can fairly present its evidence. IDEA, in fact, requires state
authorities to organize hearings in a way that guarantees parents and
children the procedural protections of the Act.”142
In Pedro’s case, the ALJ should have operated the hearing in
a way that gave the grandmother a realistic opportunity to prevail.
She was provided with a Spanish-language interpreter143 and given
the opportunity to present four witnesses.144 Even though her
witnesses provided extensive evidence that it would be dangerous for
Pedro to walk to the local elementary school145 (and the school
district offered no contradictory evidence from anyone who had seen
him attempt to walk to school), the hearing officer concluded that the
grandmother had not met her burden of proof.146 Although the
grandmother was technically allowed to present her evidence,
nevertheless, the burden of proof was not allocated properly. She
should have prevailed because, as the Schaffer Court indicated, she
had “legitimate grievances.”147
Pedro’s grandmother offered significant evidence in favor of
keeping the present level of transportation services. Pedro’s mother
had indicated at the IEP meeting that Pedro “has a disregard for
danger, and tries to cross the street by himself. When Mother tries to
correct him or hold his hand, Student hits or bites her, and cries a lot
on the way home. As a result, Mother considers Student to be a
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danger to himself and others.”148 An advocate for individuals with
developmental disabilities, who frequently came to Pedro’s home,
testified that Pedro throws “tantrums, kicks, screams and bites, while
indicating he does not want to go to school.”149 Pedro’s maternal
aunt testified that Pedro “gets very frustrated with change and will
lose control . . . When Student has to walk, he runs, and Mother
cannot catch him nor can Grandmother run after him.”150 She also
testified that the “family is very worried that Student’s behavior at
home is getting worse. He is now threatening to kill people.”151
Pedro’s Grandmother agreed with the other witnesses and testified
“that the school bus does not always get to Compton Elementary on
time. Sometimes she has to wait for the bus. Other times Student’s
behavior makes him miss the bus, and she must transport Student to
Grape Elementary, which is a 10-12 minute ride by the public Metro
bus.”152
The school district offered no evidence that contradicted the
challenges that the family would face in walking Pedro to Compton
Elementary on a daily basis. All their witnesses commented on
Pedro’s behavior after he arrived at school.153 The district offered no
testimony that disputed the veracity of the Grandmother’s witnesses.
Pedro’s grandmother, without assistance of counsel, therefore, seems
to have done a good job putting together four witnesses who testified
that it would be dangerous for Pedro to walk to Compton Elementary
to catch a bus to Grape Elementary and that his resistance to change
posed special dangers to this change in his services.154 But, like
nearly every other parent or guardian in California who proceeded on
a pro se basis during my period of investigation, she failed. With a
fairer understanding of the burden of proof, especially in cases where
a school district is trying to change a particular service that it offers,
parents should sometimes be able to prevail even without the
assistance of legal counsel.
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The Schaffer Court, as discussed above, suggested that the
burden of proof on parents is lighter when a case involves the school
district trying to change an existing rule or policy.155 While noting
that Congress did not require a child to be given the parents’
preferred educational placement during the pendency of all disputes,
it recognized that the “stay-put” provision applies when parents
challenge a school district decision to change an existing rule or
policy.156 In other words, through the stay-put rule, Congress did
presume the validity of the parent’s position when the parent was
seeking to maintain the status quo, like in Pedro’s case. Thus,
Congress would not intend for the burden of proof, even if it is
allocated to the parent, to be very high when the parent is seeking to
preserve the status quo. Consistent with Schaffer, the grandmother
should not have had a significant burden of proof in Pedro’s case.
Because the district had conceded in the past that such a service was
appropriate, it should not require much evidence to show that it was
still appropriate.
The Schaffer burden of proof rule was premised on a large set
of assumptions about the procedural fairness found in the IDEA that
could help parents overcome their information disadvantage.157
Thus, it is important for hearing officers to use their discretion in a
sufficiently flexible manner to help attain procedural fairness. The
means to allocate the burden of proof on issues such as independent
educational evaluations and continuation of services can be important
to that broader sense of procedural fairness. The Supreme Court
intended hearing officers to apply burden of proof rules within the
larger context of providing procedural fairness. As the previous two
examples demonstrate, that is not always happening in California.
III. ROWLEY
A.

General Considerations

The next case that is worthy of careful consideration because
it is often cited in California hearing officer’s decisions is Board of
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Education v. Rowley.158 That decision only applies to the issue of the
adequacy of an IEP and was never intended to protect a district from
an IEP challenge merely because the child is advancing from grade to
grade. To understand the scope of the Rowley decision, it is helpful
to remember the facts.159
Amy Rowley was born deaf.160 Before starting kindergarten,
she knew sign language, as well as some lip reading.161 She began
kindergarten shortly after Congress passed the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), and her parents were very
committed to her receiving a public education with nondisabled
children at the local public school rather than a school for the deaf,
like her father had attended and where her mother had previously
worked.162 The school system had some experience with the Rowley
family before Amy started school and had even installed a teletype
machine in the school office so they could call the Rowleys when
issues arose involving their older child.163 Although the school
district’s first response when contacted by the Rowleys may have
been to suggest Amy attend the school for the deaf, it shifted gears
pretty quickly when Amy’s parents suggested otherwise.164 The
district contacted the state of New York to learn what kinds of
services it should provide Amy so she could receive the education
guaranteed by the EAHCA.165
The Rowleys and the school district readily agreed on a range
of services for Amy.166 For example, in first grade, she would
158
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receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour each day
and from a speech therapist for three hours per week.167 She would
also receive use of a FM amplification device.168 Their point of
disagreement stemmed over the issue of whether Amy should receive
a sign language interpreter to facilitate communication between the
teacher and Amy, and between Amy and the rest of the class.169
Amy’s parents began pushing for Amy to receive sign
language interpreter services beginning in kindergarten.170 When the
school district communicated with the state about the need for such
services, the state told the school district that such services were not
necessary for a deaf child who had some lip-reading skills.171
Nonetheless, Amy’s parents insisted that Amy receive such
services.172
In response to these parental requests, the school district
agreed to conduct a trial with a sign language interpreter in February,
while Amy was in kindergarten.173 The interpreter was supposed to
assist Amy for four weeks and then the school district would evaluate
the effectiveness of the services.174
Instead, the interpreter
participated in the classroom for two weeks and suggested that the
trial end because it was clear that Amy was not benefitting from the
services.175 In an undated report, the interpreter noted that Amy
“resisted” his attempts to interpret for her except during the storytelling period for twenty minutes a day.176 The interpreter reported
that Amy’s teacher used sign language sometimes and also used
visual cues to indicate the “primary happenings” in the classroom
(such as a request to lower their voices).177 Although the interpreter
observed that Amy did “not get everything,” he also found that she
167
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would ask people to repeat information she had missed.178
described her teacher as “one in a million.”179 He concluded:
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He

I would like to say that as far as interpretive services
are concerned, they are not needed at this time.
However, this does not rule out the fact that an
interpreter will be needed at a future date when the
classroom work becomes more involved and large
group discussion becomes the rule.180
The school district did not convene an IEP meeting to discuss
these results until October of Amy’s first grade.181 Based on the fact
that the district found Amy did not benefit from the interpreter
services in kindergarten, the school committee members
recommended that Amy receive the services “mandated by the state”
and that they then “see how she continues to perform.”182 In other
words, the Committee recommended that the school district institute
a plan that conformed to the state minimum requirements for a deaf
child, in light of the interpreter’s report, but reconsider that plan on a
yearly basis in light of Amy’s evolving educational needs. That view
was consistent with the interpreter’s observation that an interpreter
was not needed “at this time.”183 After all, she was only in
kindergarten when the trial was conducted.184
No one was
suggesting that Amy could be successfully educated throughout her
schooling without an interpreter.
When Amy’s parents filed for a due process hearing in
October of Amy’s first grade year, the only issue was the validity of
the IEP that had been written based on the information then available,
including Amy’s aptitude and academic progress and the results of
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the kindergarten trial.185 Based on this evidence, both the hearing
officer and the New York Commission on Education concluded that
Amy had received a “free appropriate public education” as required
by the EAHCA.186 Relying on regulations promulgated to interpret a
different statute (Section 504), the district court reversed, concluding
that Amy was “not learning as much, or performing as well
academically, as she would without her handicap . . .” because “she
understands considerably less of what goes on in class than she could
if she were not deaf.”187 Oddly, these findings were not connected to
the service Amy requested—a sign language interpreter. Based on
the kindergarten trial, little evidence supported the conclusion that
Amy would understand more and learn more if an interpreter were
present. In fact, her stubborn attempts to ignore the interpreter188
(who actually frightened and annoyed her) supported the argument
that her kindergarten interpreter hindered her educational progress.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that it
erred when it held that “the Act requires New York to maximize the
potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the
opportunity provided non-handicapped children.”189 The Court then
went on to define what it thought Congress meant by a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE) if it did not require the
“maximization” standard.190
Before addressing the Court’s holding in Rowley, it is
important to remember what the case was not about. This case was
not about whether the district conducted a proper evaluation to
determine the scope of Amy’s disabilities. This case was not about
whether the district should have classified Amy as disabled.
Nonetheless, hearing officers often cite Rowley when evaluating a
school district’s compliance with its Child Find obligations. That is
an incorrect use of Rowley. Even though a district need not
“maximize” a child’s education, it does have the responsibility to
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See Appendix E, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(No. 80-1002).
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make sure that a “child is assessed in all areas of suspected
disability.”191
Returning to how the Court defined the appropriate standard
in Rowley as something lower than the “maximization” standard, it
said that the State satisfied its FAPE requirement by
providing personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit
educationally from that instruction.
Such
instruction and services must be provided at public
expense, must meet the State’s educational
standards, must approximate the grade levels used
in the State’s regular education, and must comport
with the child’s IEP. In addition, the IEP, and
therefore the personalized instruction, should be
formulated in accordance with the requirements of
the Act and, if the child is being educated in the
regular classrooms of the public education system,
should be reasonably calculated to enable the child
to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to
grade.192
The Court emphasized the importance of the “personalized
instruction and related services.”193 It mentioned the “personalized
instruction” twice within that paragraph.194 However, hearing
officers often emphasize the “passing marks” passage rather than the
“personalized instruction” passage. The record of Amy receiving
eight hours a week of individualized instruction and an FM system
was very important to the Court concluding she was receiving an
adequate IEP. Had she not been receiving those additional services,
it is unlikely that her record of advancing from grade-to-grade would
have been sufficient to conclude that the IEP was adequate.
Hearing officers should, therefore, not cite the “some
educational benefit” from Rowley as if “some” is a ceiling. Read in
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context, the Court stated that a school district must offer at least
“some” educational benefit because it would make no sense to have
educational dollars flow to a school district and then have the child
receive “no benefit from that education.”195 But the Court deleted the
word “some” when it went on to describe the minimum level of
educational benefit that must be provided. It said that the “basic
floor of opportunity” consists of “access to specialized instruction
and related services which are individually designed to provide
educational benefit to the handicapped child.”196 Again, as in the
passage quoted above, the Court focused on the importance of access
to “specialized instruction and related services.”197 Similarly, the
sentence concerning the “basic floor of opportunity” from Rowley
focuses on the importance of specialized instruction and related
services.198 Hearing officers should not emphasize the term “basic”
and ignore the need for specialized instruction and related services.
The Rowley Court was careful not to define one educational
standard that constitutes the “floor” for all children. It stated: “We
do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the
adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered
by the Act.”199 Instead, the Court went on to apply the legal standard
to the facts in Rowley. The case was fairly easy under the applicable
standard. Not only was Amy receiving what the Court characterized
as “substantial specialized instruction,”200 there was not even any
strong evidence in the record that her performance in kindergarten or
first grade would have been stronger had she had access to a sign
language interpreter. Further, the Court noted in an often-ignored
footnote that: “We do not hold today that every handicapped child
who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school is
automatically receiving a ‘free appropriate public education.’”201 In
this case, however, we find Amy’s academic progress, “when
considered with the special services and professional consideration
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accorded by the Furnace Woods school administrators, to be
dispositive.”202 It would therefore be a misinterpretation of Rowley
to emphasize grade-to-grade advancement rather than the scope of
services being offered in determining whether an education is
“adequate.”
By the time Amy Rowley reached fifth grade, her parents had
moved to a new school district that voluntarily agreed to provide her
with a sign language interpreter as part of her free public
education.203 Presumably, that district concluded that Amy could not
attain adequate educational benefit without a sign language
interpreter, given the greater difficulty of the academic material. But
that was not the record that the Rowley Court assessed.
Congress’s amendments to the IDEA, subsequent to the
Rowley decision, are consistent with a broad interpretation of
Rowley’s educational benefit standard. The IDEA’s current findings
state that education for children with disabilities can be made more
effective by “having high expectations for such children and ensuring
their access to the general education curriculum in the regular
classroom, to the maximum extent possible . . . .”204 Although
Congress did not overrule Rowley by requiring an education to
“maximize” a child’s potential, it has instructed school districts to
raise its educational expectations for children with disabilities. The
Department of Education (“DOE”) has also codified the oftenignored Rowley footnote with the statement that children can be
classified as disabled under the IDEA (and therefore entitled to a
FAPE) “even though they are advancing from grade to grade.”205
Mere grade-to-grade advancement, under the language of Rowley or
the DOE regulations, is therefore not sufficient evidence of a FAPE.
The proper determination of FAPE can only be made on the basis of
an individualized assessment of the specialized instruction and
related services offered to the child in light of his or her disabilities.
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Mercer Island

The Third and Sixth Circuits have interpreted the Rowley
standard to support a “meaningful” educational benefit standard206
under which one would measure educational benefit “in relation to
the potential of the child at issue.”207 California hearing officers
rarely, if ever, use the adjective “meaningful” to describe the amount
of educational benefit that must be accorded under the IDEA in order
for an IEP to be adequate because of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
J.L. v. Mercer Island School District.208 Thus, it makes sense to look
at that case closely to see that it does not stand for a narrow reading
of the “adequate educational benefit” standard in Rowley.
Mercer Island was a case in which parents sought
reimbursement for the expense of sending their child to a private,
residential school in Massachusetts.209 After ten days of hearing, and
re-argument in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Schaffer v.
Weast, the hearing officer in Washington State allowed the parents to
present some additional evidence and ruled for the Mercer Island
School District.210 The complicated case involved a battle of the
experts, in which the parents argued that their child was making little
or no educational progress within the school district, and could only
make adequate progress at the residential private school.211 By
contrast, the school district argued that the child was making
adequate educational progress and would not make better progress at
the private school.212 The fundamental legal issue in the case was the
meaning of an “adequate” education under Rowley, especially in light
of the Supreme Court’s recent determination that the burden of proof
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was on the parents to demonstrate that the education offered by the
school district was inadequate.213 Because the Ninth Circuit had
been placing the burden of proof on the school districts in such cases,
this case was one of the first cases decided by the hearing officer
under the new rules.214 The hearing officer cited Rowley and the
post-Rowley cases to make the long-established point that the “school
district is required by the statute and regulations to provide an
appropriate education, not the best possible education, or the
placement the parents prefer.”215
The hearing officer only cited cases decided before 1997 in
describing the meaning of the term “adequate education.”216 On
appeal, the parents’ attorney emphasized language in the 1997 IDEA
Amendments to argue that the school district did not offer their child
an education that could lead to independent functioning because it set
too low a standard for her reading and writing abilities.217 They
never asked the court to rule that the 1997 Amendments had
overturned Rowley, nor did they argue that the 1997 Amendments
were a new statute.
Unfortunately, the federal district court judge misunderstood
the legislative history underlying the IDEA.218 She thought that the
Education for Handicapped Children Act (EHCA) and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act were different statutes,
not realizing that Congress merely renamed the EHCA to IDEA in
1990 to conform to the language used in the Americans with
Disabilities Act.219 Thus, she mistakenly concluded that Congress
overturned the Rowley decision through enactment of the 1997
version of the IDEA.220 Citing to the findings for the 1997 Act, she
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says that those findings are “such a significant departure from the
previous legislative scheme that any citation to pre-1997 case law on
special education is suspect.”221 That statement was simply wrong,
because there is no statement in the legislative history that indicates
that Congress was overturning Rowley through any of its
Amendments to the EHCA or IDEA.222 The courts never conclude
that Congress impliedly overturns Supreme Court interpretations of
statutes. Because the district court judge was so wrong on the
appropriate legal standard, the court of appeals had to reverse her
decision.223
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Mercer Island. The Ninth Circuit recognized
that there has been some inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit on the
issue of how to define the required educational benefit but said that
the “educational benefit,” “some educational benefit” and
“meaningful” educational benefit standards all “refer to the same
standard.”224 Thus, it did not disavow the approach taken in the
Third and Sixth Circuits where the “meaningful” educational
standard is dominant, but also recognized that it was wrong to
interpret the 1997 IDEA Amendments as overturning Rowley.225 No
other circuit has held that Congress has overturned Rowley, and the
Ninth Circuit would have been on weak ground if it had agreed with
the district court judge on that point. But it is also wrong to interpret
the Ninth Circuit’s decision as invalidating the “meaningful”
educational standard approach.
A good example of a correct application of the “meaningful”
educational progress standard can be found in the California ALJ
opinion in Parents v. Bellflower Unified School District.226 This
complicated case involved a child, “Edward,” who was originally
classified as having a speech and language impairment but was
221
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actually autistic with a significant cognitive impairment.227 During
the time period when Edward was only classified as having a speech
and language impairment, he was receiving a 30-minute speech and
language session, two times a week, in a small group with two to
three students.228 Despite receiving these intensive services, the
school district’s speech and language pathologist determined that his
receptive language was in the second percentile, and his auditory
comprehension was in the seventh percentile. The ALJ opinion
reported that Edward had “progressed” with respect to his receptive
language since his initial assessment about a year earlier; his auditory
comprehension increased from a standard score of 71 in October
2006 to a 77 in February 2008.229 With respect to his expressive
speech, the school district’s speech and language pathologist reported
that Edward scored in the first percentile;230 the ALJ found that this
score reflected that he did not fall further behind his peers despite a
record of numerous absences from school.231 Despite this report, the
school district recommended reducing Edward’s speech and language
therapy to fifty minutes per week, kept his original goals, and did not
recommend any individual speech and language sessions.232 The
school district only agreed to increase the speech and language
therapy to seventy-five minutes, including fifty minutes of individual
therapy, after his parents obtained a private evaluation about six
months later.
While recognizing that Edward did not fall further behind his
peers with respect to expressive speech and made some minor
improvement in receptive speech, the ALJ concluded that he had not
made “meaningful” progress during this time period.233 The ALJ
concluded that the school district had “failed to provide Student with
sufficient speech and language services to permit Student to make
meaningful educational progress until the District increased these
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services.”234 The evidence in this case that the school district had not
provided appropriate speech and language services was so strong that
the school district conceded, on appeal, that the student needed
individual sessions.235 It only defended the change from sixty
minutes to fifty minutes, arguing that there was no showing of harm
from a ten-minute per week reduction in services.236 Although the
parents had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the IEP was
inadequate, the district court judge affirmed the ALJ decision in
favor of the parents, in part, because the school district offered no
evidence at the IEP meeting or in court as to why it reduced the
services for a child who was already not making meaningful
progress.237 Thus, the district court judge correctly interpreted
Schaffer v. Weast in not imposing an overly harsh burden of proof on
the parents. The combination of a correct reading of the definition of
an adequate educational plan and the parents’ burden of proof
resulted in a favorable decision for Edward.
Although Edward’s parents prevailed in this case, it is
important to notice the considerable efforts they had to employ in
order to obtain a successful outcome. They challenged the school
district’s proposed IEP, brought a due process complaint, and then
defended the successful ALJ opinion on appeal to the district
court.238 They needed to pursue this multi-year process in order to
prevent the school district from reducing the services being provided
to a child who was making virtually no academic progress. They
hired a lawyer and obtained a private evaluation to contest the school
district’s actions.239 One can imagine that many parents would not
have the resources to challenge a school district’s conduct in such a
case.
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IV. REMEDIES FOR PROCEDURAL ERRORS
The final, important problem that is worthy of extensive
discussion is the grounds upon which an ALJ can grant relief when a
procedural error has occurred. The regulations provide that:
In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing
officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE
only if the procedural inadequacies—
(i) Impeded the child’s right to a FAPE;
(ii) Significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process
regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent’s
child; or
(iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit.240
The regulations do not require a finding that a procedural
violation led to a denial of FAPE; they merely say that a hearing
officer may find that the procedural violation led to a denial of a
FAPE.241 Because of the discretion that appellate courts must give to
hearing officer decisions, it is therefore not surprising that hearing
officers need not worry that their discretionary decision will often be
overturned on appeal. Nonetheless, the reluctance of hearing officers
to conclude that a procedural violation resulted in the denial of a
FAPE is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in both
Rowley and Schaffer on the importance of procedural compliance to
the IDEA. In order for California hearing officers to start to
determine that procedural violations have resulted in a denial of a
FAPE, it would be helpful to know what kinds of procedural
inadequacies have led other courts to determine there was a denial of
FAPE. Three examples are discussed below. Two of the examples
are from California cases in which the district court judge overruled
the ALJ because the ALJ failed to conclude that the procedural
violation caused a denial of FAPE.

240
241
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Impeded the Child’s Right to a FAPE

A good example of a procedural problem impeding a child’s
right to a FAPE can be found in Edward’s case against the Bellflower
Unified School District in which both the ALJ and the district court
judge concluded that the procedural violations resulted in a denial of
FAPE.242 This is a case in which the School District made many
errors, including the unilateral reduction in the amount of speech and
language services.243 Because the school district could offer no
explanation for this reduction, the error caused Edward not to receive
a FAPE.244 Another error was that the school district did not test
Edward for autism until his parents provided them with a
comprehensive assessment suggesting autism.245 The ALJ found in
favor of the parents on this issue even though the school district had a
basis for not testing for autism—that the parents kept insisting that
they did not believe their child was autistic even after their
pediatrician had diagnosed Edward as autistic.246 The ALJ found that
the pediatrician’s diagnosis coupled with Edward’s display of
behaviors that were consistent with an autism diagnosis should have
triggered an autism assessment by the school district.247 The ALJ
found that the school district had the obligation to assess Edward in
all areas of suspected disability irrespective of the parents’ beliefs
about the appropriate diagnosis.248 Further, the ALJ found that the
failure to assess Edward with respect to autistic-like behaviors
“denied him a FAPE,” because his existing IEP did not take into
account his full set of disabilities.249
The district court judge agreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that
the school district failed to assess Edward for special education
services related to autism.250 But the judge also followed the
242
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statutory requirements more closely and specifically found that this
procedural error caused a loss of educational opportunity by
substantively denying Edward a FAPE.251 The judge said:
Although the ALJ did not explicitly conduct this
harmless error analysis for determining whether the
failure to assess denied Student a FAPE, his
subsequent conclusions that Student’s February 2008
and March 2009 IEPs substantively denied him a
FAPE are tantamount to a finding that the failure to
assess was not harmless. We agree with these factual
findings, and we conclude that the District’s failure to
assess resulted in the loss of educational
opportunity.252
This clarification by the district court judge is relatively
minor but, from a precedential standpoint, is helpful to lawyers who
are looking for cases in which an express finding of educational harm
from a procedural error has occurred. Thus, it is fortunate that the
judge clarified the legal issues. This case can serve as a model for
the kind of case in which a procedural error can give rise to a
remedial order—a failure to identify a disability can result in an
inappropriate educational plan.
B.

Denied an Opportunity to Meaningfully Participate

The denial of an opportunity to participate meaningfully is an
issue frequently raised by parents because of their sense that the
school district predetermined the IEP without considering the
available evidence. This feeling of frustration may be particularly
commonplace in California because school districts seem to often
combine the eligibility meeting with the IEP meeting. Because
school personnel have only a limited amount of time to attend an IEP
meeting, one would expect that this process leads to rushed meetings
at which parents may not feel like they can offer sufficient input.

251
252

Id. at 5–6.
Id.

Fall 2012

California Hearing Officer Decisions

503

An example of a case from the Los Angeles Unified School
District, J.P. v. Los Angeles Unified School District,253 where this
combined eligibility/IEP model was used, can show how it can cause
harm to the child, especially when important issues are not resolved
at the sole IEP meeting that is scheduled. The ALJ’s opinion was
overturned by the district court, also showing how difficult it can be
for parents to enforce their rights.254 They may need to go through
two stages of a multi-year process to attain justice.
This case involved a boy, who I will call “John,” who had
attended second through sixth grade at a private school.255 Despite
having high cognitive aptitude, John was struggling in school and
having quite significant difficulties with social interactions.256 Based
on the advice of the private psychologist they had hired, his parents
decided to contact the school district for assistance in educating their
son.257 An eligibility/IEP meeting was held on June 10, 2008 at
which the team agreed that John was eligible for special education in
the autism category.258 The school district agreed to send John’s
parents a list of three schools to consider for their son in the fall
because the IEP team had agreed that he needed to attend a nonpublic
school.259 The IEP would not be finalized until the parents visited
the proposed schools.260 Although the district usually takes two
weeks to send the potential list to the parents, it did not send the list
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until August 6, 2008.261 It did not communicate with John’s parents
about the names of the schools that would go on that list.262
The three schools were not in session when John’s mother
received this information in August.263 She reviewed information
about two of the schools online and decided they were not
acceptable.264 In one school, John would have been the only seventh
grader, and the emphasis of the school seemed to be behavior.265 In
the other school, 53% of the students had been designated as
emotionally disturbed.266 John’s mother attended an open house
informational session at the third school.267 She also visited the
school twice and concluded it was not appropriate for John because
the principal discouraged the use of computers, the students appeared
to have severe social problems, and her son was more high
functioning than the other children in the program.268 She sent a
letter to the school district informing it that she would enroll her son
at a private school not on their list—Bridges Academy—because of
her disagreement with the appropriateness of the educational
programs suggested by the school district.269 After receiving that
letter, the district sent a letter to John’s parents identifying a single,
appropriate placement (after the school year had already begun).270
The person who sent that letter had not participated in the IEP
meeting.271 The letter provided no explanation for the district’s
decisions.272
At the due process hearing, John’s parents argued that the
school district had not allowed them to meaningfully participate in
the selection of a school because the IEP never identified a specific
program, and the list of potential schools did not arrive until a few
261
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weeks before the beginning of the school year.273 The school district,
by contrast, argued that the parents did not participate in good
faith.274 They had paid a non-refundable tuition to a private school
before receiving the list of schools from the district in August.275
The school district argued that the parents “were merely seeking
funding for a placement choice that they had made prior to the IEP
meeting.”276 The hearing officer ruled for the district, concluding
that it was not a procedural failure for the school district to fail to
make a specific offer of placement in a timely fashion.277
The district court overruled the hearing officer, finding that
the school district’s actions precluded John’s parents from
meaningfully participating in the process.278 The district court judge
identified the following problems:
·
·
·

·

·

Only a single IEP meeting occurred; there was no evidence of
any meaningful discussion of placement options at that time.279
The August letter was sent by a district employee who did not
participate in the IEP meeting.280
No final IEP meeting was ever convened to justify the
September, single-offer placement letter. The person who wrote
that letter had not attended the June IEP meeting.281
The multiple-placement offer placed an undue burden on the
parent to ferret out potentially inappropriate placements, which
infringes on the parents’ right to participate.282
The school district failed to provide a formal, written offer (even
by the time the ALJ rendered her decision).283
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The difference of opinion between the ALJ and the district
court judge seems to involve the issue of the parents’ good faith. The
hearing officer seemed willing to allow the district to offer the
parents less opportunity to participate because of their supposed
determination to send their child to a specific private school.284
The hearing officer’s decision is surprising in light of the
testimony that the parents’ lawyer elicited from the school district
representative who sent the August and September letters about
school placement options.285 The school district representative
testified:
that she had not followed district policy that required
that she collaborate with the parents, provide support
to the parents in making a selection, arrange visits to
the [private] options, and explain to the parents the
intake and admissions procedures at the potential
[private] placements . . . [she also] conceded that a
seven-week delay in receiving an offer of placement
was an unusually long amount of time.286
Oddly, the school district claimed that it was not aware of the
parents’ determination to send their child to another private school
during the time when it was stalling to put together an offer of a
placement.287 So, its explanation for providing the parents a lack of
an opportunity to participate was a post hoc explanation. Thus, if
that process was typical for the School District, the District Court
judge’s ruling should help guide the School District prospectively
with respect to how it works with parents to select an appropriate
school placement. The district court judge was very clear: “the error
was not technical, the error was not harmless, and J.P.’s parents were
prejudiced.”288 But it took a multi-year process for the parents to
finally prevail on appeal.
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Caused a Deprivation of Educational Benefit

This category is similar to the first category except that it
tends to apply when a child is not even on an IEP due to the school
district’s procedural errors. Thus, the child is not able to receive the
kind of educational benefits that would be available under an IEP.
A 2009 California case provides an example of when
procedural errors caused a deprivation of educational benefits.289
Due to academic and behavioral problems in school, the school
district held eligibility meetings in February 2005, June 2006, and
December 2006.290 At each meeting, the district concluded that
“William” was ineligible for special education services.291
Meanwhile, William repeated first grade; a Section 504 plan was put
in place for William under which he was only expected to complete
50% of class work, and a behavior plan was also put in place.292
Even with these rules in place, he completed about half of the
required work (or 25% of the work altogether).293 In particular, he
very much disliked writing and completed few writing
assignments.294
William’s parents thought he had ADHD and a writing
impairment and that these impairments were having an adverse effect
on his educational performance.295 They filed a due process
complaint on June 20, 2007, at the end of his third grade.296 The ALJ
ruled that the school district had complied with its Child Find
obligations and that, even if William had a specific learning disability
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See W.H. ex rel. B.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV F 08-0374
LJO DLB, 2009 WL 1605356 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2009) [hereinafter Clovis District
Court Opinion]. See also Student v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., OAH Case No. N
2007060634, at 6 (Dec. 17, 2007) (Debra Huston, ALJ), available at
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/oah/seho_decisions/2007060634.pdf (last visited
Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Clovis ALJ Opinion].
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or other health impairment, he did not need special education and
related services.297 William’s parents appealed that determination,
and a district court judge reversed the ALJ, in part, in a decision on
June 8, 2009, at the end of William’s fifth grade.298 The district court
judge ruled that the “[d]istrict failed to assess Student in the area of
writing and failed [to provide Student a FAPE based on its failure to
identify him] as eligible for special education and related services
under the category of [Other Health Impairment].”299 The procedural
ground for relief was the deprivation of an education benefit (IEP)
caused by a failure to identify William as disabled.300 Unlike the
category one case involving Edward, the school district was not
following an existing IEP; the procedural violations caused William
not to have an IEP at all. A close examination of the record shows
how difficult it is for parents to have the necessary “firepower” to
win this kind of case.
William was identified as having ADHD in 2003, prior to
beginning first grade at a public elementary school within his school
district.301 He repeated first grade so he attended first grade in both
2003–2004 and in 2004–2005.302 The school district first assessed
William in January and February of 2005 and held an eligibility
meeting on February 22, 2005.303 The team determined that William
was not eligible for special education and related services because he
was making adequate progress in the regular classroom, but it also
convened a Section 504 meeting (with the same group of people) and
created an accommodation plan for him.304
The February 2005 evaluation indicated that William received
a standard score of 79 on the visual motor-integration evaluation,
placing him in the sixth percentile.305 Although that score could have
been the basis for the conclusion that he had a learning disability in
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writing, the school psychologist concluded that his writing problems
were “behaviorally based” because he simply refused to write.306
The February 2005 evaluation also indicated that William had a
standard score of 83, which is the thirteenth percentile, on a test of
working memory.307 Although a low working memory score can be
an indication that a student’s ADHD is having an adverse educational
effect, the school district did not consider that score sufficient to
qualify William as disabled under IDEA.308 The February 2005
evaluation also included an assessment in the area of
social/emotional functioning.309 These scores reportedly placed
William in the “at risk” range with respect to adaptive skills,
depression and hyperactivity.310 William’s parents’ expert testified at
the due process hearing that there were numerous scoring errors with
this instrument, and the ALJ observed: “Overall, [the school
psychologist] did not know what the difference in Student’s BASC
scores would be in the absence of the errors.”311 Despite these low
scores, significant behavioral problems in the classroom, and errors
in reporting test results, the ALJ concluded that the school district
had no obligation to evaluate William for a behavioral disability prior
to April 2006.312
The ALJ opinion does not describe William’s Section 504
plan but the district court opinion states that, under the Section 504
plan, William was only required to complete 50% of the schoolwork
assigned during the 2005–2006 school year (second grade).313
Despite this accommodation, he only completed 50% of his
accommodated work—in other words, he was completing about 25%
of the work assigned to the second grade class.314 Because William
was struggling with writing, the Section 504 team met in October
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2005 to discuss whether William had a written language disorder.315
Rather than suggesting testing to determine if William had a
language disorder, the team relied on his second grade teacher’s
report that he was “probably at grade level” based on the few writing
projects that William would complete.316
Meanwhile, William began having behavioral problems. He
was behaving aggressively towards other children, having tantrums
in class, and not completing class work. The school district put in
place a behavior support plan in February 2006; the support plan
stated that his behaviors were interfering with his learning.317 The
school district began to suggest to William’s parents that William
might qualify as eligible for special education under the category of
“emotional disturbance.”318
The school district agreed to assess William for special
education eligibility in April 2006,319 but its assessment plan was
quite incomplete because it was based on the assumption that his
problems in school were primarily due to an emotional disturbance.
Thus, the school district did not assess William for a deficit in visualmotor integration despite the low score from the 2005 assessment in
that area. Nonetheless, a private psychologist had administered a
visual-motor integration test to William in November 2005, and he
had obtained a standard score of 85, within the average range.320
Based on these test results, the ALJ concluded (and the district court
affirmed) that the district “had no reason to suspect that Student had a
disability in the area of visual-motor integration . . . .”321
Unfortunately, this conclusion confuses the issue of whether there is
any reason to “suspect” a disability with the substantive result after
such an evaluation is completed. The change in William’s standard
score from 79 to 85 is likely within the confidence interval for the
standard error of measurement of the testing instrument.322 An 85 is
315
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exactly one standard deviation below the mean (100) and is barely
within what can be called the “average” range. Later tests may have
concluded that William did not have a visual-motor disability, but the
legal question should have been whether there was any reason to
suspect that William had a visual-motor deficit in April 2006 when
the school district agreed to conduct additional testing. And such
evidence did exist from both the scores of 79 and 85 within the last
six months.
The April 2006 evaluation did include an attempt to evaluate
William’s writing.323 One reason for not conducting this assessment
until that time was that he was receiving grades of A and B in his
classes;324 but that observation ignored that he was only completing
about 25% of the class work. In fact, William was producing very
little writing in class.325 The scope of his writing problems should
have triggered an evaluation before April 2006.
The writing evaluation that was conducted as part of the April
2006 assessment was woefully incomplete. The school district’s
resource specialist tried to get William to produce a writing sample in
May 2006 but was unable to do so.326 The school district primarily
based its evaluation of William’s writing abilities on his average
score of 104 from the Woodcock-Johnson assessment, but that
assessment did not require William to produce any sustained writing;
it only required him to fill in the blanks and write simple
sentences.327 The school district also had one piece of writing that
William had produced at school on a favorite topic and with
tremendous assistance from the school psychologist328—a threeparagraph, nine-sentence writing sample describing his favorite
Pokémon character.329
The ALJ explained why she considered it appropriate for the
school district not to conduct a thorough writing assessment in the
SERVICES, available at http://www.fldoe.org/ese/pdf/y1996-7.pdf (last visited Jan.
9, 2013).
323
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fall of 2006 and spring of 2007. She placed weight on William’s
proficient score on the spring 2007 STAR exam330 even though that
exam was exclusively a fill-in-the-bubble examination, did not
require students to write,331 and was taken under conditions of
accommodation. She also placed much weight on the Pokémon
writing sample that she described as having been written “without
any help,”332 ignoring the extensive assistance offered by the school
psychologist to get him to complete that piece of writing.333 Finally,
she ignored the evidence that William’s writing had deteriorated even
further in third grade because he “rarely produced written work in the
classroom.”334 Despite the absence of much evidence that William
could produce grade-level writing, the ALJ credited testimony from
the school psychologist that William was “capable” of doing gradelevel work and that his failure to complete work was “his choice.”335
The district court judge was quite critical of the ALJ’s
determination that William’s difficulties in writing were simply a
result of his “choice.”336 That conclusion ignored evidence that
William would “freeze up” or “shut down” when he tried to write and
that he often could not even write on a topic that he enjoyed
greatly.337 Similarly, it ignored his mother’s testimony that he could
not write even if he wanted to do so. The district court judge
concluded: “At best, Student’s ability to write was inconsistent and
based partly on his behavior. For these reasons, writing expression
was an area of suspected disability for Student, and District’s child
find obligation was triggered at the beginning of the relevant time
period and continued throughout.”338
One reason that the ALJ and the district court reached
different conclusions about the adequacy of the writing evaluation is
that they gave different weight to William’s expert’s testimony.
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William’s expert, Dr. Patterson, testified that William was unable to
sustain writing effort.339 The ALJ discredited Patterson’s testimony
because he was unaware of the Pokémon writing sample and had not
spoken with William’s teachers or observed William in the
classroom.340 These are the same kinds of errors that the Los
Angeles School District raised in the case involving Kathleen—they
criticized Kathleen’s expert for not having personally tested her in a
case involving the adequacy of the school district’s evaluation.341
But in a case involving the adequacy of the school district’s
evaluation—where the parents are seeking an independent
educational evaluation or a violation of the district’s child-find
obligations, the parent’s expert need not have evaluated the child at
all. The parent’s expert can merely review the testing done by the
school district. In William’s case, the expert did conduct an
extensive evaluation of William and concluded he had ADHD and a
disorder of written expression.342 But William’s parents should have
been able to prevail merely by attacking the school district’s sloppy
evaluation rather than conducting an evaluation of their own. Hence,
the district court concluded:
[t]he testimony of every witness supported Dr.
Patterson’s expert opinion that Student is unable to
sustain writing effort. Thus, Student’s single writing
sample does not negate Dr. Patterson’s professional
opinion, even if he was unaware of it. In evaluating
Student’s written expression, District ignored the
undisputed evidence that Student rarely produced
written work in the classroom. The overwhelming
and consistent testimony from all witnesses is that
Student is impaired in written expression, sustained
writing, and the initiation of writing.343
The district court judge was correct to conclude that the
school district had sufficient evidence of William’s writing
339
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difficulties to justify a full writing assessment. But William’s
witnesses need not have proved that William was actually impaired
in written expression to justify an assessment. The district court’s
discussion confuses the question of whether an assessment should
occur with the issue of whether the child is actually disabled.
Although William’s parents eventually prevailed on this issue
in the district court, it is important to emphasize how difficult it was
for them to prevail. They filed the due process complaint on June 20,
2007 after more than two years of pressing the school district to
identify their child as having a disorder in written expression.344
Their original due process hearing was scheduled for August 28,
2007, but they had to ask for a continuance because they could not
get Dr. Patterson to evaluate William until August 25, 2007.345 The
due process hearing was rescheduled for September 13, 2007, but
William’s parents were not able to use Dr. Patterson as an expert at
that time because they had not yet shared his report with the school
district.346 They had to ask for another continuance until October 15,
2007 so that they could share his report.347
The ALJ issued a decision in favor of the school district on
December 17, 2007, about six months after William’s parents filed
their due process complaint.348 That decision was not overturned
until June 8, 2009, when he would have completed fifth grade.349
And the district court merely remanded the case back to the ALJ.350
It is quite possible that William did not receive special education
services in the area of writing for third, fourth, and fifth grades based
on the ALJ’s decision from 2007.
Nonetheless, the case reflects the district court (but not the
ALJ) concluding that the “failure to assess Student in his writing,
including determining all aspects of Student’s difficulty with written
expression, deprived Student of educational benefits”351—the third
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type of procedural error for which one can get relief under the IDEA.
But, as with other cases discussed above, the parents only prevailed
after pursuing a multi-year litigation process.
V. CONCLUSION
In California, as in many other jurisdictions that I examined,
it is very difficult for parents to prevail at a due process hearing.
Hearing officers impose a high burden of proof on parents and
construe Rowley so as to make it very difficult to challenge the
adequacy of an IEP. School districts in California also seem to be
quite litigious, even challenging the child’s right to an Independent
Education Evaluation. I hope that closer attention to the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Schaffer and Rowley, along with closer
consideration of situations in which relief can be ordered based on
procedural violations, will cause parents to have a better chance of
prevailing in California and elsewhere in the future.

